A critical remote code execution vulnerability in SignalWire FreeSWITCH, tracked as CVE-2026-116779, is being actively exploited in the wild. The flaw lets a remote attacker run arbitrary operating system commands with the privileges of the FreeSWITCH process by sending a single crafted SIP MESSAGE request. CISA added the bug to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on November 9, 2026, and public proof-of-concept code is already circulating.
What Happened: FreeSWITCH Command Injection Under Active Exploit
SignalWire disclosed CVE-2026-116779 on November 5, 2026. The vulnerability lives in the sofia_presence_handle_sip_i_message() function inside the Sofia SIP module, which handles inbound SIP MESSAGE events. Under the hood, the function splits the To header of an incoming MESSAGE on the plus sign and treats the left portion as a chat protocol name. That name selects which registered chat interface handles the message.
Because mod_dptools registers a chat interface called api, an attacker who controls the protocol selector can force the server down the API execution path. The request then reaches switch_api_execute(), and the FreeSWITCH API runs the command with the full privileges of the telephony daemon. Effectively, a SIP message becomes a remote shell.
CISA confirmed active exploitation and added the flaw to the KEV catalog on November 9, 2026. Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies were given a remediation deadline of November 12, 2026. Researchers also state that exploitation of this path has been observed in the wild, and a public proof-of-concept repository is available, which lowers the barrier for opportunistic attackers.
Technical Details of the FreeSWITCH Vulnerability
The FreeSWITCH code injection vulnerability is rated CVSS 9.8 by NVD, reflecting the combination of network reachability, low complexity, and full system impact. The following conditions define the attack surface:
- Affected versions: All FreeSWITCH releases prior to version 1.11.3.
- Default posture: Any SIP profile that accepts inbound MESSAGE is exposed. The stock
conf/vanillaconfiguration leaves chat handling enabled on both the internal and external profiles. - ACL gap: The inbound ACL does not cover the MESSAGE method, so tightening SIP ACL rules does not remove a profile from scope.
- Authentication: Where MESSAGE authentication is enforced, a single registered account is enough. Installations that still ship
conf/vanilla/directory/default/default.xmlneed no account at all, because that file defines adefaultuser with no password and no a1-hash. - Second sink: Where
mod_luais loaded, which the stock configuration does, inline Lua with the full standard library is reachable as an alternate command execution path.
The proof-of-concept trigger is a single inbound SIP MESSAGE whose To header carries an api protocol selector. The result is command execution with the privileges of the FreeSWITCH process, full call control, and disclosure of configuration and credentials, including SIP account secrets.
Furthermore, the maintainers point out that no universal exploit exists. Each deployment needs an application-specific way to deliver the malicious SIP payload to the vulnerable parser. Still, that constraint has not slowed attackers down, since the affected products are widespread in contact center and service provider environments.
Business and Operational Impact
FreeSWITCH runs in a large share of contact centers, SIP trunks, hosted voice platforms, and emergency call routing infrastructure. A compromised instance gives an attacker control of a voice platform, which carries consequences well beyond a single server.
- Remote code execution: Attackers run arbitrary OS commands as the FreeSWITCH user, which typically holds access to call detail records, recording files, and routing logic.
- Credential theft: Configuration files and SIP account credentials can be read, allowing call fraud and toll abuse billed to the victim organization.
- Call interception and fraud: Full call control allows silent eavesdropping, call diversion, and premium-rate abuse.
- Service disruption: Crash loops or destructive commands take down a telephony platform, which can block inbound customer support and emergency calls.
- Lateral movement: Hosts reachable from the FreeSWITCH server become the next target, extending the incident beyond the voice environment.
- Compliance exposure: Communications metadata and recordings may fall under regulatory obligations in telecom, healthcare, and financial deployments.
Mitigation and Recommendations
SignalWire released the fix in FreeSWITCH 1.11.3 and ships it in the October 2026 release line. The patch introduces a per-profile enable-chat-api-proto parameter that is off unless explicitly set, so the route is closed by default. A MESSAGE that selects the proto where it is not enabled is answered with a 403 response and logged with the source address and the requested command.
Immediate Actions for Defenders
- Upgrade to FreeSWITCH 1.11.3 or later. This is the only action that closes the vulnerable code path.
- Set
enable-chat=falseon profiles that do not need inbound SIP chat. This stops the message before the protocol selector is parsed. - Remove directory users with no password and no a1-hash. The stock configuration ships two,
defaultand the Skinny example, and these allow unauthenticated access. - Do not rely on
auth-messagesalone. Combined with removing passwordless users it reduces the flaw to authenticated command execution, but the path stays open. - Set
disable_system_api_commands=trueas defense in depth. This removes the system API, though other API routes remain reachable. - Hunt for exploitation in SIP logs. Look for inbound MESSAGE requests with plus signs in the
Toheader, 403 responses carrying the new API proto log entries, and unexpected child process execution under the FreeSWITCH service account. - Rotate exposed credentials. Assume SIP account passwords, configuration secrets, and any shared credentials stored on the host may be compromised.
Long-Term Hardening
- Segment telephony platforms from general enterprise networks with strict firewall policy.
- Rate limit and log all SIP MESSAGE traffic at the session border controller.
- Run FreeSWITCH under a dedicated low-privilege account with a read-only filesystem where possible.
- Monitor the CISA KEV catalog continuously and treat KEV additions as same-week patching work.
Bottom line: CVE-2026-116779 gives attackers unauthenticated remote code execution over a single SIP message, and CISA has already confirmed exploitation in the wild with public proof-of-concept code available. Upgrade FreeSWITCH to 1.11.3 today, close the chat proto selector in configuration, and hunt your SIP logs for exploitation attempts.
Incident Summary
| CVE ID / Incident: | CVE-2026-116779 (SignalWire FreeSWITCH) |
| Affected Systems: | SignalWire FreeSWITCH versions prior to 1.11.3 |
| Disclosure Date: | November 5, 2026 |
| CISA KEV Addition: | November 9, 2026 (federal due date November 12, 2026) |
| Patch Status: | Available in FreeSWITCH 1.11.3 |
| CVSS Score: | 9.8 |
| Exploitation Status: | Actively exploited; public proof of concept available |
References
- SignalWire, “GHSA-mg63-h38w-8p9p: Inbound SIP MESSAGE can select the api chat proto and run FreeSWITCH API commands,” November 5, 2026, https://github.com/signalwire/freeswitch/security/advisories/GHSA-mg63-h38w-8p9p
- CISA, “CISA Adds Four Known Exploited Vulnerabilities to Catalog,” November 9, 2026, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/11/09/cisa-adds-four-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
- The Hacker News, “CISA Warns of Active Exploitation of OpenSSH, GPUStack, FreeSWITCH, and IBM Flaws,” November 10, 2026, https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/cisa-warns-of-active-exploitation-of.html
- National Vulnerability Database, “CVE-2026-116779: SignalWire FreeSWITCH Code Injection Vulnerability,” https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-116779
- CVE Brief, “CVE-2026-116779: SignalWire FreeSWITCH, actively exploited,” https://cvebrief.com/cve/cve-2026-116779/