Miasma Supply Chain Attack: Red Hat npm Packages Compromised

A new supply chain attack campaign codenamed Miasma has compromised multiple @redhat-cloud-services npm packages. The attack steals developer credentials and CI/CD secrets through install-time malware. It also delivers a self-propagating worm designed to spread across software supply chains.

What Happened: Miasma Supply Chain Attack Hits Red Hat npm Packages

On June 1, 2026, security researchers at Socket, JFrog, Microsoft, and multiple firms disclosed a malicious campaign targeting the Red Hat Cloud Services npm namespace. The attackers injected obfuscated malware into legitimate packages via a compromised GitHub account.

The campaign uses tactics from the open-sourced Shai-Hulud attack framework. Consequently, attribution remains difficult. TeamPCP, the group behind Shai-Hulud, recently published the tooling publicly. This has lowered the barrier for copycat attacks.

The first malicious commits appeared on May 29, 2026. They carried the description “Miasma: The Spreading Blight.” The payload runs automatically during npm install through a preinstall hook. Therefore, developers do not need to import or execute the package for infection to occur.

Technical Details of the Miasma Malware

The malware uses multiple obfuscation layers to evade detection. First, the package.json triggers a preinstall script that runs node index.js. The index.js file contains a heavily obfuscated JavaScript loader.

The loader decrypts embedded payloads using AES-128-GCM. It then writes the decrypted code to a random temporary file in /tmp. Moreover, it executes the payload with Bun and immediately deletes the file to avoid disk forensics.

The main payload harvests a wide range of sensitive data from infected machines:

• GitHub Actions secrets and npm tokens
• Cloud credentials (AWS, GCP, Azure)
• Kubernetes and Vault configuration material
• SSH keys and Git credentials
• CI/CD pipeline secrets

Furthermore, the malware exfiltrates stolen data to api.anthropic[.]com:443/v1/api. It also uses GitHub as a fallback mechanism. The attacker commits encrypted results to public GitHub repositories through the API.

Another noteworthy feature is the malware’s avoidance of Russian-language systems. This pattern matches prior GlassWorm supply chain campaigns. In addition, the malware checks for endpoint protection from CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, and StepSecurity Harden-Runner before executing.

The malware also establishes persistence by injecting hooks into Anthropic Claude Code and Visual Studio Code tasks.json files. This ensures the worm reactivates during every developer session.

Business and Operational Impact

The Miasma campaign poses severe risks to organizations using affected Red Hat Cloud Services packages. The impact extends far beyond a single compromised developer machine.

• CI/CD pipeline takeover: Stolen GitHub Actions tokens allow attackers to inject malicious code into build pipelines.
• Downstream supply chain poisoning: The worm can repackage and sign new npm tarballs, spreading to dependent projects.
• Cloud infrastructure compromise: Harvested cloud credentials grant attackers direct access to production environments.
• Cryptographic key exposure: Stolen SSH keys and Vault material enable lateral movement across corporate networks.
• Reputational damage: Organizations distributing poisoned packages face trust erosion from customers and partners.

Moreover, because the malware generates a uniquely encrypted payload for each infection, detection and version tracking are significantly more challenging. This polymorphic behavior complicates both signature-based and behavioral detection efforts.

Mitigation and Recommendations

Immediate Actions for Defenders

1. Audit package installations: Check if any affected @redhat-cloud-services packages were installed between May 29 and June 1, 2026.
2. Isolate infected hosts: Quarantine any developer or CI/CD machines that installed the malicious versions.
3. Rotate all exposed credentials: Immediately rotate GitHub tokens, npm credentials, cloud access keys, SSH keys, and Vault secrets.
4. Invalidate build artifacts: Suspend affected workflow runs and discard any container images, npm packages, or deployments created during the exposure window.
5. Remove persistence artifacts: Inspect ~/.claude/settings.json, .vscode/tasks.json, and .github/workflows for injected hooks or unauthorized workflows.

Long-Term Supply Chain Hardening

• Pin npm package versions and verify checksums before installation.
• Use private registries with vulnerability scanning for all internal dependencies.
• Enable GitHub’s dependency review and secret scanning alerts.
• Implement least-privilege access for CI/CD runners and build pipelines.
• Require signed commits and code review for all repository changes.

Bottom line: Uninstalling the npm package or deleting node_modules is not sufficient cleanup. The malware includes background execution and developer-tool persistence mechanisms. Organizations must treat this as a full incident response, not a simple dependency update.

Incident Summary

Incident Name:	Miasma Supply Chain Attack
Affected Packages:	@redhat-cloud-services/vulnerabilities-client, tsc-transform-imports, topological-inventory-client, sources-client, rule-components, remediations-client, rbac-client, and others
Disclosure Date:	June 1, 2026
First Malicious Commits:	May 29, 2026
Attack Vector:	Compromised GitHub account → malicious orphan commits → npm preinstall hook
Exfiltration Targets:	api.anthropic[.]com:443/v1/api and GitHub public repositories
Patch Status:	Malicious versions removed from npm; Red Hat has addressed the compromise

References

1. Socket Research Team, “Mini Shai-Hulud Campaign Hits Red Hat Cloud Services npm Packages,” June 1, 2026, https://socket.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-campaign-hits-red-hat-cloud-services-npm-packages, accessed June 1, 2026.
2. The Hacker News, “Miasma Supply Chain Attack Compromises Red Hat npm Packages with Credential-Stealing Worm,” June 1, 2026, https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/miasma-supply-chain-attack-compromises.html, accessed June 1, 2026.
3. JFrog Security Research, “Shai-Hulud Miasma: Red Hat Cloud Services,” June 1, 2026, https://research.jfrog.com/post/shai-hulud-miasma-redhat-cloud-services/, accessed June 1, 2026.
4. OX Security, “New npm Supply Chain Attack: Red Hat Cloud Services Compromised,” June 1, 2026, https://www.ox.security/blog/new-npm-supply-chain-attack-redhat-cloud-services-compromised, accessed June 1, 2026.
5. Wiz Research, “Miasma Supply Chain Attack Targeting Red Hat npm Packages,” June 1, 2026, https://www.wiz.io/blog/miasma-supply-chain-attack-targeting-redhat-npm-packages, accessed June 1, 2026.
6. SafeDep, “Red Hat Cloud Services Hit by Mini Shai-Hulud npm Worm,” June 1, 2026, https://safedep.io/redhat-cloud-services-hit-by-mini-shai-hulud-npm-worm/, accessed June 1, 2026.