Mior and Skyfall Attacks Break AMD SEV-SNP Confidentiality
The Mior and Skyfall attacks disclosed this week break the confidentiality guarantees of AMD SEV-SNP, the confidential computing platform used to protect virtual machines from malicious cloud hosts. Two ETH Zurich research teams showed that a rogue hypervisor operator can read guest memory, alter running VMs, and forge hardware attestation reports. AMD has tracked the flaws as CVE-2026-0462 and CVE-2026-40671, and both proof-of-concept attacks are public.
What Happened: Mior and Skyfall Attacks Defeat AMD SEV-SNP Isolation
AMD SEV-SNP promises that a virtual machine’s memory stays encrypted and access-controlled even when the cloud provider controls the hypervisor. This week, researchers showed that promise does not hold. Two separate attacks, presented at the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, break the model from different angles.
The first attack, named Mior, targets the startup process of the Platform Security Processor (PSP). The second, Skyfall, builds on AMD’s Transient Scheduler Attacks and leaks guest state through instruction timing. Both were demonstrated in laboratory tests on AMD EPYC server processors, and both researchers have released working proof-of-concept code.
AMD has rated Mior 5.9 and Skyfall 4.9 on the CVSS 4.0 scale. Firmware updates are already shipping, with platform firmware due in November for Skyfall and December for Mior. Neither AMD advisory reports the flaws being used in real attacks.
Technical Details of the Mior and Skyfall Vulnerabilities
The Mior attack exploits the moment SEV-SNP initializes its memory ownership table. The PSP builds a Reverse Map Table (RMP) during startup, recording which owner holds each page of memory and what it may do. The researchers redirected the PSP’s writes away from main memory and into a PCIe device they controlled, such as a graphics card, and returned plausible values when the PSP read them back to validate the table.
The startup sequence therefore finished without an error, but part of the real RMP, including the entry protecting the RMP itself, was never initialized. The hypervisor could then rewrite the RMP’s protections at will. Using the PSP’s own debug commands, the team enabled debugging on a confidential VM that had it disabled and read and wrote guest memory. The attack succeeded in all 1,000 attempts across both test runs.
Mior also defeats attestation. Because SEV-SNP measures a guest image at startup and the PSP signs that measurement, the researchers copied a benign VM’s measurement into a malicious one. The malicious VM then produced valid-looking attestation reports describing the harmless software.
Requirements for Mior are strict:
- Control of the host hypervisor
- Control of the host BIOS/UEFI, including memory-routing settings left unlocked
- Control of a PCIe device such as a graphics card
Skyfall requires less. When a hypervisor intentionally fails a VM start, the processor has already cached part of the guest’s saved state. That data survives without cleanup and can be recovered through transient timing measurement. The team recovered saved register values and a disk encryption key from a test VM. Beyond VMs, Skyfall also read decrypted CPU microcode and System Management Mode memory that even the kernel normally cannot access.
Business and Operational Impact
These attacks matter most to organizations that moved sensitive workloads to confidential VMs specifically to stop their cloud provider from reading data. That entire security assumption fails under Mior and Skyfall.
- Secret exposure, including encryption keys, credentials, and regulated data resident in guest memory
- Guest tampering, because Mior can modify running VM memory and disable the protections tenants rely on
- Attestation forgery, letting a malicious host pass off a tampered workload as a verified one
- Firmware-level compromise, since Mior requires BIOS control, a privileged position that also threatens bare-metal hosts
- Vendor and cloud responsibility gaps, since fixes must be applied by the server maker and the cloud provider, not the tenant
- Compliance exposure, where data residency and processing agreements rely on hardware-enforced isolation
Notably, both debugging and attestation tests in Mior worked with ciphertext hiding enabled, an optional SEV-SNP feature meant to keep the hypervisor from even reading encrypted guest memory. The research teams note that ordinary VMs already trust their host, so Mior mainly affects tenants who selected confidential computing for isolation guarantees.
Mitigation and Recommendations
Patching depends on firmware and microcode that tenants cannot install themselves. Cloud providers and server OEMs have to act first, and customers then have to verify the result.
Immediate Actions for Defenders
- Ask your cloud provider for the SEV-SNP attestation TCB values for every confidential instance type, and compare them against AMD’s published fixed values
- Confirm that platform firmware for Skyfall and Mior has been applied on your AMD EPYC hosts, including the BIOS update from the server maker
- Update Supermicro H12, H13, and H14 boards using the published BIOS and BMC firmware fix list
- Re-verify SNP attestation results and TCB values after every firmware update, because stale values can hide a vulnerable platform
- Rotate any encryption keys or secrets that were held in memory on affected confidential VMs
Longer-Term Guidance
Furthermore, treat confidential computing as one layer rather than a guarantee, and do not place long-lived secrets in guest memory on multi-tenant hardware you do not control. Also, watch for the second wave of firmware releases for embedded EPYC models, which AMD expects between January and April 2027. For organizations using AMD’s EDK II firmware, apply the earlier TSA mitigations alongside the pending EDK II patch for CVE-2026-18448, which rates 5.6. In addition, monitor for anomalous attestation reports or workloads that do not match expected measurements.
Bottom line: Mior and Skyfall show that AMD SEV-SNP’s promise of hiding virtual machines from a hostile cloud host does not hold in the current generation of EPYC servers. Push your provider for firmware updates, verify TCB attestation values, and move secrets out of guest memory until the December Mior platform firmware is confirmed installed.
Incident Summary
| CVE IDs: | CVE-2026-0462 (Mior, CVSS 4.0 5.9) and CVE-2026-40671 (Skyfall, CVSS 4.0 4.9), plus CVE-2026-18448 for the EDK II SMM leak |
| Affected Systems: | AMD SEV-SNP on EPYC 7003, 8004, 8005, 9004, and 9005 server lines; Zen 3 and Zen 4 confirmed for Skyfall, Zen 5 confirmed for Mior. EDK II firmware builds are also affected by the SMM issue |
| Disclosure Date: | November 11-12, 2026, ahead of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy |
| Patch Status: | SEV firmware dated August 12 for Mior and microcode dated August 12 for Skyfall are released; platform firmware due November 2026 (Skyfall) and December 2026 (Mior); embedded fixes due January-April 2027 |
References
- The Hacker News, “New Mior and Skyfall Attacks Let Rogue Cloud Hosts Steal Secrets From AMD SEV-SNP VMs,” November 13, 2026, https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/new-mior-and-skyfall-attacks-let-rogue.html, accessed November 15, 2026.
- AMD, “AMD Security Bulletin AMD-SB-3059: Mior,” 2026, https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3059.html, accessed November 15, 2026.
- AMD, “AMD Security Bulletin AMD-SB-3061: Skyfall,” 2026, https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3061.html, accessed November 15, 2026.
- ETH Zurich SCL, “Mior: Attacking AMD SEV-SNP,” CCS 2026, https://xca-attacks.github.io/mior/mior_ccs26.pdf, accessed November 15, 2026.
- Skyfall research team, “Skyfall: Transient Scheduler Attacks on AMD SEV-SNP,” 2026, https://skyfall-attack.github.io/assets/skyfall.pdf, accessed November 15, 2026.
- Supermicro, “AMD-SB-3059 Security Advisory and BIOS Fix List,” 2026, https://www.supermicro.com/en/support/security_AMD-SB-3059, accessed November 15, 2026.